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STATEMENT OF ISSU55 PRESENTED FOR REVISE
(1) Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in denying
Appellant's pro-se motion to re-appoint counsel on appeal.
(2)

Was Appellant denied his right to effective assistance

of counsel on his direct appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals?

OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
In Re;

State V. Humphries,

case no. 880704-CA,

the Court

of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction of Issuing Bad Checks,
a felony in the third degree,
76-6-505 (1)

(Supp. 1988),

in violation of Utah Code Ann.

citing that the issues presented for

review v/ere not properly preserved before the trial court.

STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is properly before
this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2 (5). and Rules
42 and 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Lotion for
enlargement of time in which to file said Writ of Certiorari was
filed and granted on December 14th 1989.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant,
1988,

Thomas R. Humphries, was convicted November 4th,

in a trial by jury of the charge Issuing Bad Checks in

violation of Utah Code Ann. 76-6^505
appealed,

(1). Defendant subsequently

the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an

unpublished Memorandum Decision filed November 15th,

I989.

Prior

to appointed counsel's filing of a Docketing Statement, Defendant
filed with the trial court a pro-se motion to re-appoint counsel

on appeal,

on January 19th,

January 31st,

1989,

said motion was denied on

1989. (attached hereto as Adendum "A") After

appointed counsel filed his brief in the Utah Court of appeals
the Befendant filed with the reviewing court a motion to reappoint counsel as counsel refused to address meritoriously
arguable issues as requested.

The Utah Court of Appeals denied

said motion in an order dated July 20th,

1989 (attached hereto

as Addendum'^").

To fully address the issues presented for review it is
necessary to begin at the initial conflict occurring in the
case at bar.

For benefit of this Court it should be noted that

all three Davis County Public defenders are also at the same time
Prosecuting City Attorneys for various cities within Davis County
(sent. T. 10).

At the time set for Preliminary Hearing the trial court
appointed Attorney Glenn T. Cella a Davis County Public Defender,
to represent the Defendant.

The Defendant at that time raised an

issue of conflict being that Attorney Cella was also Prosecuting
Attorney for the City of Kaysville,

the City that had filed and

investigated the charges against the Defendant.

Counsel stated

to the Court that he felt there was indeed a conflict and didn't
fee'l 'it was appropiate for him to proceed in the case at bar
(prelim. T.3-6).

Attorney Cella at that time attempted to to turn

his conflict to Davis County Public Defender Attorney Steve Vanderlinden
who was at the same tine Prosecuting Attorney for the Git- or"

(2)

Clearfield,

Attorney Vanderlinden refused to accept the appointment

citing two reasons for his refusal;

that he didnft feel

(1)

Attorney Cellafs conflict was legitimate under the scope of the
contract with Davis County;

and two (2)

that he shouldn't have

to accept the additional burden that the caseload would present
(T.3-6 12/20/88)

(T. 5 1/3/89).

Attorney Cella then retained

Attorney Cathcart to represent the Defendant at trial • The
Defendant strenously objected to the finacial arrangements existing
between counsel's at the time of trial (trial T. ^-5)«

At the

time set for sentencing counsel for the Defendant filed with the
trial court the following motions;

(1)

Notice of Appeal;

Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause;

(2)

(3) Withdrawal of Counsel,

The trial court questioned counsel as to why he was appointed as
opposed to Attorney Vanderlinden,

Counsel responded that Attorney

Vanderlinden had a conflict of interest with the Defendant (sent, T,
10).
The trial court then appointed Attorney Vanderlinden as
appellate counsel. At the hearing held December 20thf
Vanderlinden failed to appear before the court,

1989, Attorney

instead he asked

Attorney Cella to enter an appearance before the court to explain
his refusal to accept said appointment on appeal,

subsequently

the trial court ordered Attorney Vanderlinden to accept said appointment
(T.3-6 12/20/88).

The trial court then continued the hearing

ordering Attorney Vanderlinden to present himself before the court.
At the time of the hearing the Defendant objected to Attorney
Vanderlinden's representation without him having first review the
trial transcripts (T«5 1/3/89)•

The trial court again continued the

hearing determining that it would be advantageous for counsel to first

(3)

review the trial transcripts prior to arguments being heard(T.9
1/3/89).

The Defendant subsequently filed a pro-se motion to

dismiss and re-appoint appellate counsel and raised two issues
one (1)

that counsel having previously stated that in his opinion

the conflict occurring was not a true conflict,

he would be unable

to effectively represent the Defendant on that issue on appeal;(2)
that counsel was unprepared because of his excessive caseload and
refused to raisemeritourisly arguable issues on appeal (T.4-9 1/31/89).
(T. 4 3/1V89)

(T. 19-20 3/28/89).

The Defendant repeatedly requested counsel to raise on appeal
the following issues;

(1)

the conflict occurring at trial due to

the contractual arrangement between Attorney's Cella and Cathcart;
(2)

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for his failure to

raise an objection to the numerous errors occurring throughout the
trial;
(d),
(5)

(3)

the issue of "plain error"

Utah Rules of Evidence;

as defined by Rule 103 (2)

(4) the cumulative affect of the errors*.

the convictions used against the Defendant in sentencing that

were erroneous, that were properly objected to at the time ofsentencing,

these issues were addressed in letters to both counsel

and the Court of Appeals and is additionaly supported by the trial
court record•
* Attorney Vanderlinden having filed a brief on behalf of the
Appellant v/ithout addressing the meritourisly arguable issues related
above,

the Defendant at that time again requested that the court

dismiss and re-appoint counsel on appeal,

said motion was denied

in a Utah court of Appeals order dated July 20th,
Defendant's conviction having been affirmed,

1989*

The

he would now request

that this Court grant his Writ for Certiorari,

to review the issues

of conflict of counsel and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
The Petitioner would contend that the representation he recieved on
appeal were in violation of Article One Section Twelve of the Utah
Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.

ARGUMENT
ISSUE NUMBER ONE!

Whether the Utah Court of Appeal and the trial court erred in
denying Appellant's pro-se motion to re-appoint counsel on appeal.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to have the compulsary process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence."

This language has been read to include the right of indigents
to appointed counsel in felony prosecutions,
372 U.S. 355,

83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed 2d 799 (1963),

self-representation,
2525,

Faretta V. California,

45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (197*0

1449 n.14,

the right to

422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct.

and the right to effective assistance

of counsel, McMann V. Richardson,
S. Ct. 1441,

Gideon V. Wainwright,

397 U.S. 759 t 771 n. 14, 90

L.Sd. 2d 763 (1970);

Birt V. Montgomery,

725 F.2d 587, 592 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Sixth Amendment right
(S)

to counsel has four components;
quality of counsel,

right to have counsel, minimum

a reasonable opportunity to select and be

represented by chosen counsel and the right to preparation period
sufficient to assure minimum quality counsel);
569 F. 2d 1318,

1323 (5th Cir. 1978).

Court in Faretta,

supra,

Gandy V, Alabama.

The United States Supreme

stated as follows?

"The language and spirit of the Sixth
Amendment contemplates that counsel, like other
defense tools guaranteed by the amendment, shall
be an aid to a willing defendant.*** To thrust
counsel upon the accused, against his considered
whish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment.
In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but
a master? and the right to make a defense is
stripped of personal character upon which the
Amendment insists.*** An unwanted counsel 'represents1
the defendant only through a teneous and unacceptable
legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced
in such representation, the defense presented is not
the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for,
in a very real sense, it is not his defense.***
But it is one thing to hold that every defendant,
rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of
counsel, and quite another to say that a State may
compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not
want. The value of the state-appointed counsel was
not unappreciated by the Founders, yet the notion
of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to them.
And whatever else may be said of those who wrote the
Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt that
they understood the inestimable worth of free choice."

Thus,

a defendant in a criminal trial,

or in the case

at bar on appeal , does not have an absolute right to counsel
of his choice when indigent,

but, when the defendant has made

a showing that irreconcilable differences have created a conflict,
that conflict should be fully explored by the trial court. Both
the trial court and the reviewing court made a determination that
they could see no violations of Constitutional rights suffered
by the defendant,

however controlling case law on the issue
. <u - _i—,^ «y^ ah on id be presumed

by the court, when such an issue is raised.
vVheat V. United States, 486 U.S. 153,
L.Ed. 2d 140 (1988),

In the case of

108 S. Gt. 1692, IOC

the Court found that counsel should be

replaced when "even the appearance of impropriety exists."

The duty rests with the trial court to examine thoroughly
the attorney-client relationship and to examine it as a very serious
duty.

In White V. White, 602 F. Supp. 173 (Mo. wd 193*0,

the

defendant requested several times that his court-appointed counsel
be replaced.

The basis of his complaint was that counsel working

with an overburdened caseload and had,

therefore,

failed to

exercise the customary skill and dilligence that a competent attorney
would have shown under similiar circumstances.

The Court was of

the opinion that when an accused is forced to stand trial with the
assistance of appointed counsel with whom he has become embroiled
in conflict,
of counsel.

the accused is denied his right to effective assistance
The Court stated in that case as follows;

"The trial court, when confronted by such an
allegation, has an obligation to inquire thoroughly
into the factual basis of the defendant's dissatisfaction.
If an attorney and a client have an irreconcilable
conflict, essential attributes of a healthy attorneyclient relationship are non-existent. ***
... a careful Bxaminatoin into the nature of the
disagreement, its duration and the impact it would
have on the conduct of the defense should have been
conducted
Had the reasons for the conflict been
fully explored, the air might have been cleared. On
the other hand, the completeness of the rift between the
two might have been established.... Under the circumstances,
petitioner need not show that he was actually prejudiced
by the irreconcilable conflict with his counsel.
Freiudice should be presumed from a fractured attorneyclient relationship just as it would be if the petitioner
had been denied the assistance of counsel.11
(7)

In the instant case Attorney Vanderlinden had been appointed
by the trial court on appeal and for the purposes of post-trial
motions before the court,

at the hearing on December 20thf

Attorney Vandelinden refusing to represent the defendant,

1988,
requested

that Attorney Cella stand in and explain the situation to the trial
court, Attorney Cella addressed the court as follows:

Mr, Cella: Judge we've had a discussion between Mr, Oda, Mr.
Humphries and myself regarding the problems arising to the public
defenders system or to our public defenders contract out of Mr,
Humphries appeal. We've explained the problem to Mr. Humphries,
and he has certain constitutional rights that he's not willing to
waive, and we aren't asking him to waive any of those rightsT
However, I had a conflict in this originally in the case.
It was investigated by a Kaysville City police officer. Under
the public defender system contract, my conflicts of interest are
supposed to be assigned to Mr. Vanderlinden. Mr. Vanderlinden
felt that the conflict generated by my prosecution for Kaysville
City was not a true conflict under the scope of the public defender
contract, and he declined to accept the —accept the case through
the public defender system.
••••• Mr. Cella: Stephan and I spent a few minutes talking with
Judge Page about the probability of trying to get some idea of where
the court wanted us to go on this matter. And Judge Page requested
and said that in situations such as that and in the event that Mr.
Vanderlinden declined to accept my conflict of interest, that that
posistion should be made known to the Court."
... So in any event, as I was explaining, Jud^e Page said in
additional situations such as that, I should merely inform the
Court and order the Court to order Mr. Vanderlinden to take the
case. And Judge Page said that would be how to handle the matter."
(T. 3-5 12/20/88)
Further,

four members of the bar attempted to explain

to the trial court Attorney Vanderlinden felt that a conflict
existed between himself and his client, (1) Attorney Cathcart,
at sentencing (T. 10); (2) Attorney's Cella and Oda, as related
above;

(3) District Attorney Brian Namba (T. 5 1/03/89)•

(8)

*he

trial court repeatedly refuse to accept Attorney Vanderlindenfs
posistion on the conflict,

rather the court deciding to exert

it's influence over Attorney Vanderlinden to accept the case;
"The Court? When did you talk to Mr. Vanderlinden last on this?
I talked to him a week ago, and he was going to do this personally.
Mr. Cella:

That's total news to me.

The Courts I talked with him right after we were in court two
weeks ago. I worked with him for three or four days. And by
Friday, a week ago, last Friday, he said I'll take the case."
(T. 5 12/20/88)

Who better than counsel,

should determine whether a serious

conflict exists between himself and his client and then for the
trial court to exert improper influence over Attorney Vanderlinden
to accept a case he did not want, was indeed an error in judicial
discretion.

The Petitioner would respectfully requset that this Court
grant it's V/rit of Certiorari to review the above related circumstances
for abuse of discretion in violation of the Defendant's right to
the assistance of counsel.

ISSUE NUMBER TWO!
Was Appellant denied his right to effective assistance of counsel
on -his direct appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals?
When nev/ly appointed counsel attempted to argue a Motion for
Certificate of Probable Cause, without first a review of the trial
transcripts (T. 5-6 l/03/89)f
doctrine,

had never heard of the "plain Error"

told the defendant that the issue of the trial court

properly addressed on appeal,
relief,

but, at matter for post-conviction

the defendant knew he was in trouble and subsequently

petitioned the trial court for appointment of new counsel on appeal
(T.4 1/31/89).

The trial court denied the motion and subsequently

Attorney Vanderlinden filed a brief on the defendant's behalf in
the case at bar. When the Defendant learned that the brief did
not contain the meritoriously arguable issues as requested by the
defendant,

he then petitioned the Court of Appeals to appoint new

counsel on appeal which was denied.

In the case of Strickland V. Washington,

80 L.Ed 2d 674 (1984),

the U.S. Supreme Court enuniated the general rules relating to the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as follows:

••This Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order
to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.
That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present
at trial along side the accused, however, it is not
enough to satisfy the constitutional command. The
Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance
of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a
role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial
system to produce just results.
For that reason, the Court has recognized that "the
right to counsel is the right to effective assistance
of counsel." Strickland at 691 and 692.

This Court in the case of State V, McNicol, 55^ P. 2d 203
204 "Cu'tah 1976),

stated that:

"the right of the accused to have counsel is not satisfied
by a sham or pretense of an appearance in the record
by an attorney who manifests no real concern about
the interests of the accused, v^e is entitled to the
assistance of a competent member of the bar, who shows
(U)

a willingness to identify himself with the interests
of the accused and present such defenses as are
available under the law and
consistent with the
ethics of the proffession.M

In the present case the petitioner requested repeadedly that
counsel raise and argue certain issues on appeal as related below
from post-sentencing transcripts as follows:

Mr, Humphries: As the Court's well aware, on several occasions
I brought the issue of conflict of counsel, I won't get into
that today, your Honor. I would ask that considering the
conflict that the Court would reserve me or allow me to argue
after Attorney Vanderlinden is through if I feel that is necessary.
The Court: I don't care.
all right with me,

If you want to argue your case,

it's

i'lr. Humphries: Your Honor not necessarily argue but at least
put it on the record to reserve the issues for appeal.
••., I just want the Court to be aware of the fact that right
now I do not recognize Attorney Vanderlinden as counsel even though
the court has allowed him to argue this certificate of probable
cause, I don't feel that Attorney Vanderlinden can effectively
represent my interest in this case.
The Court: It seems like you have a hard time deciding if he is going to represent you or not,
Mr, Humphries: No,sir.
Attorney Vanderlinden,
The Court:

The Court has ordered me to proceed with

No, I haven't.

Mr. numphries:

So much. Or procees pro-se.

The Court: That's correct,
another attorney.

I have said I'm not appointing you

Mr. Humphries: I told the Court, your Honor, that I'm not
capable of representing myself. I have no choice but to go along

.th him to some certain extent to try and help my defense, to
•y and make it valid at least a little bit,
,e Court: Are you through? ••

(T. 5-6 3/14/89)

*• Humphries: Your Honor, if I may nlease, I asked counsel
> bring up these issues before. He didn't think it was proper
; the time, but I think he has second thoughts after Attorney
imba's arguments.
Attorney Namba brought up the issue of prosecutorial misconduct,
Ld we would ask the Court that it would consider the misconduct,
Le statements of dishonesty throughout his closing arguement when
.ewied as a whole whether they would be considered plain error and
) go further into the ineffectiveness of counsel during the trial,
>r counsel not to object to all these f different things through the
•ial: the voir dire, Attorney Namba s repeated references to
r
dishonesty, instructions to the jury, even the association
Lether the jury foreman recognized a witness. And Attorney Cathcart
tiled to object, and the Court did not delve in a little bit
irther into that f relationship. So when viewed as a whole, would
;torney Cathcart s representation be considered ineffectivenedistance of counsel?"

Several times both on the record and by letters, which were
jver answered by counsel (T. 8 3/1^/89)f
Lat these issues be raised on appeal.
•A. N.Y.

the defendant asked

In the case of Barnes^V Jones,

1981, 665 F2d 427 the Court addressed the issue of

pointed counsels failure to raise issues as requested as follows:
ff

•• .where a defendants appointed counsel intends to argue
particular colorable points, but defendant requests that
he raise additional colorable points, counsel must argue
the additional points to the full extent of his proffession§.
ability, and appointed counsels judgement that defendant
is unlikely to prevail on the merits of his non frivilous
arguements is no substitute for an active advocates
presentation of those arguments to the appellate court.11
In the case at bar the defendant made every effort to explain
bo both the trial court and the Court of appealsf
vas refusing to raise issues as requested.
sourt the on the issue the defendant stated:

that counsel

In addressing the trial

The Court: I assume what your probably saying in the matter,
Mr. Humphries, is that you want to be listed as co-counsel?
Mr. Humphries: Your Honor, no, I don't think that I'm even
capable of co-counsel, I just want to—I just want to be able to
assert my rights before the Court. That is all, your Honor. The
Court has made a decision that Attorney Vanderlinden is goin£* to
represent me in this matter. I have brought the issue to the Court.
The Court:

You made the decision.

Mr. Humphries: The issues I feel are pertinent to this are
on the record, and I hope they're on the record for the purposes
of appeal I filed with the Utah Court of Appeals. So, therefore,
to protect my interests, I think I've done all I can. I leave the
rest up to the Court, your Honor. " (T. 10-3/1V89)

Further,

the petitioner has identified omissions by counsel

that "fall outside the wide range of proffessinally competent assistance."
State V. Frame,

723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) . In the case of

Estes V, texas,

38I U.S.

Offutt V. United States,

532, 5^3
3^8

(1965)

U.S. 11,

citing in part

14 (1955) t the Supreme

Court stated:
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement"
of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence
of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system
of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness..... To perform its high function
in the best way "justice must satisfy the appearance of
Justice."

Conclusion
The petitioner would request that theCourt grant it's Writ
of Certiorari to review the above entitled case for violations
of defendant's rights a guaranteed by the United States Constitution

and the Constitution of the State of Utah.

It is the Petitioners

contention that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution combine to assure each and every defendant
is afforded the oppourtunity to have a fair and impartial trial
and a fair and impartial review on aoneal.

Respectfully submitted t h i s
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IN PROPIA PERSONA
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MAS R. HUMPHRIES
D. BOX v 2 5 0
&PER UTAH 84020

FILED '.'
OAVi'

PROPIA PERSONA

^

IN THE SECOND

^

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN £NDFOR .DAVIS :CDUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LE; J T Y CLERK

Case No.Cr6119

ATE OF UTAH

Motion to dismiss counsel

PLAINTIFF

and for appointment of

OMAS R. HUMPHRIES

new counsel on Appeal

DEFENDANT

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT, comes now the Defendant
mphries

and

^ £ 3 7

| 9

hereby moves the court for an order appointing

1 appeal of the case at bar.
> dismiss previously
idigency peviously

new counsel

The Defendant would also petition the court

appointed counsel. As
filed with

shown by the affidavit of

the 1 court for the request of counsel he is

lable to pay costs of obtaining said counsel.
Dated this / Qf

day o f t ^ ^

1989

Thomas R. Humphries
IN PROPIA PERSONA
hereby certify that I delivered
true and correct copy of the
aregoir.g motion on the following
y deposit with the U.S. mail.
Davis~pbunty D i s t r i c t Attorney
Thomas R. Humphr

Thomas R.

KS9J.VJ |8 /JH0 37

HOMAS R. HUMPHRIES
.0. BOX 250
RAPER UTAH 84020

ri r

-i\ I

•^."JrvcLEnx

H PROPIA PERSONA

IN THE SECOND JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TATE

CASE NO. CR6119
motion for purchase of transcripts
at the states expense

OF UTAH

PLAINTIFF
VS
30MAS R. HUMPHRIES
DEFENDANT

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT, the Defendant moves the court for
i order directing the state to pay the cost of preperation and filing of the
ranscripts of the foiling hearings of record, Arraingmsnt, Pre trial
id sentencing , and any other record that would properly enable

the Defendant

> present his case on appeal.

Dated this /Q

day of L W " * Q /

1989

Thomas R, Humphries
IN PROPIA PERSONA
hereby certify that I have served
true and correct copy of the foregoing
on the following individual, by deposit
th the U.S. Mail.
vis County District Attorney

omas R. Humphries
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FILED
JUL 2 01989
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

S t a t e of U t a h ,
Plai itiff

*
and R e s p o n d e n t ,

v.

ORDER

)
)

)

Case No. 880704-CA

)
)

Thoma s R• Humph r i e s,
Defeidant and Appellant,

This matter is before the Court upon appellant's Motion To
Appoint New Counsel On Pendency Of Appeal, filed 26 June 1989.
Appellant is currently represented by counsel who was
appointed by the Second Judicial District Court. Counsel
entered an appearance herein on 3 February 1989 and, to date,
has filed a docketing statement and brief on behalf of
appellant. Counsel has responded timely to inquiries made by
the Court with respect to this appeal.
Appellant shox^s no substantial conflict of interest T*Tith
his attorney. As appellant was appointed competent counsel,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant's motion is denied. If
appellant prefers new counsel, appellant is not precluded from
hiring counsel of his choice.
Dated this J20

day of July 1989.
BY THE COURT:

Jackson

lard C. Davidson
ding Judge

TBtafj Court of Appeals

sell W. Bench
:iate Presiding Judge

th M. Billings

4 0 0 Midtown Plaza
2 3 0 South 5 0 0 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 0 2

nal W. Garff

801-533-6800

Mary T. Noonan

lela T. Greenwood

Clerk of the Court

man H. Jackson

Jill i n -

! Ml ,

II < J N 9

gory K. Orme

Thomas R. Hump hi: I es
P.O. B o x 2 5 0
D r a p e r . U T 84020
I r. K e :
State of Ut. d:\,
PI a i nt i f f a rul Respondent,
v.
Ni
Thomas R. Humph r ies,
Defendant «nd Appellant:,

880 ; 3- 1 C A

Dear Mr. Humphries:
The Court received your letter June 15, 1989 in
above appeal in which you contend that you have been
ineffectively represented throughout your case. Your letter
will be docketed as having been received. However, absent a
motion to this Court, no action may be taken.
Sincerely,

Lice Hill
Deputy Clerk
cc:

Steven C. Vanderlinden
R. Paul Van Dam
Deputy Davis County Attorney
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
——00O00—

t

zry T. Noonan
•terk of tn« Court
h Court of Appeals

—

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

State of Utah,
11 din! it £ j111J Respondent,
v.

Case No. 880704-CA

Thomas R. Humphries,
•• Detendant and Appellant.
Before .Judges Qrme, Garff and Davidson,

PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from a conviction for Issuing Ba<' Checks..
third degree felony, in violation of'Utah Code Ann. § :6-6-505(l}
(Supp. 1988),
We affirm the conviction.
On May 5, 1988/ defendant Thomas R. Humphries opened a
checking account at the Washington Drive-up Branch of F i r r ^
Security Bank in Ogden, Utah. Defendant deposited $100 into the
account, which was the only deposit he ever made*
The bad check
charge was based on the following six checks that were not
honored by the bank:
DATE WRITTEN
May 26,
May 27,
May 30,
May 30,
June 5,
June 5,

1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988

PAYEE
Bowman's Market
Bowman's Market
K-Mart
Bowman*:, Ma i. k.i '1
Ernst
Ernst

-AMOUNT
$ 90.00
$ 90.00
$273.36
$ 70.00
$ 93.19
$ 70.93

At trial, the State introduced into evidence fifteen additional
checks that had been returned for insufficient funds. Each of
those checks was dated prior to the six checks described above.
Humphries testified that he did not knowingly issue the
bad checks. He explained that sometime between May 5 and 15,
1988, he had given a friend, Dorie Stewart, a deposit slip and

$3/600 in cash to be deposited in his checking account• He
claimed that Stewart did not deposit the cash/ but applied it
to a debt owing to her by defendant. Defendant testified that
the money was a settlement from a fire insurance claim which
was split between him and two business partners. He testified
that he did not report the money taken by Stewart to the police
because he owed her money.
Defendant called Dorie Stewart as a witness. Prior tc
her testimony, counsel for the State examined her on voir
dire. Outside the presence of the jury, counsel advised
Stewart of her rights under the Fifth Amendment against
self-incrimination and of the penalties for theft and perjury.
Stewart then declined to testify based on the Fifth Amendment.
In closing argument, the State told the jury that
Stewart "didn't want to"lie, but she also didn't want to tell
the hard truth and that is, that this man is dishonest". The
prosecutor also stated in closing that defendant is a
"dishonest person" and to "disregard the testimony of the
defendant because of his dishonesty."
'. On appeal, defendant raises five claims of error.
First, he claims it was prejudicial error for the prosecution
to state to the jury, in closing argument, his opinion that
defendant was a dishonest person. Second/ he contends that the
prosecution improperly threatened a witness if she testified.
Third, he asserts that it was prejudicial error for the
prosecution to question defendant as to why he did not subpoena
a witness for trial. Fourth, defendant contends it was
prejudicial error to allow bank records into evidence that wer=:
not a basis for the charges against defendant. Finally,
defendant urges that it was error to allow defense counsel to
represent defendant at the preliminary hearing where he had
admitted he had a conflict of interest. In response, the State
contends that defendant failed to preserve the first four
issues for appeal and argues that the final issue is merit!ess
because defendant expressly waived the conflict.
We have reviewed the portions of the record pertaining
to the assignments of error and agree that four of the issues
have not been properly preserved for appeal. First, the record
reflects no objection to the prosecutor's comments in closing
argument. Absent an objection, we are precluded from reaching
the merits of the issue on appeal. See State v. Hales, 652
P.2d-1290, 1292 (Utah 1982), As to the second assignment of
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error, the record contains no objection to the voir dire
examination of witness Dorie Stewart. Third; although we agree
it is inappropriate during cross examination for the
prosecution to make any suggestion that defendant has a burden
to establish a defense, the record also contains no objection
to the prosecution*s questions concerning defendant's failure
to secure corroborative testimony. The foregoing issues were
not properly preserved in the trial court and may not be
considered for the first time on appeal.
Defendant's fourth contention is somewhat more
complicated. The charges against defendant were based upon the
six checks previously set out in this decision. At trial, the
prosecution examined the custodian of the records pertaining to
defendant's checking account. The witnesses' testimony covered
all transactions on the account during its existence. At tb°
beginning of the testimony, defendant's counsel jnade a geneiax
objection "to the relevancy of the bank records other than
those records that particularly pertain to the exhibit that the
state has entered." The trial court clarified the nature ci
the objection with counsel by inquiring if counsel was
objecting to the admission of "other checks other than the ones
that we're prosecuting." Defense counsel agreed that this was
the objection he intended to make. The court overruled the
objection "at this time," indicating "I haven't heard anything
objectionable, but you'll have to redo your objection if
something comes up that is objectionable." Defense counsel
acquiesced in this procedure. The prosecution submitted
photocopies of fifteen checks, in addition to the six checks
that are the basis of the charge. Defense counsel objected to
the use of photocopies of the checks, which was resolved, but
made no other objection to the admission of the checks. We
conclude that the issue has not been preserved for
consideration on appeal.
Defendant's final claim is that the jury verdict should
be overturned because counsel who represented defendant at the
preliminary hearing had a conflict. We note that the
preliminary hearing transcript was not transmitted to this
court by the trial court as a portion of the official record.
Instead, the first eleven pages of a document entitled
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing was submitted as an adden im
to defendant's brief and, as such, is not a part of the
official record before this court. We further note, however,
thgdb.both defendant and the State have relied upon this
addendum, and on that basis, neither may challenge its *sli-:: -y
as an accurate depiction of the proceedings. At the time of
the preliminary hearing, defense counsel, Glen Cella, indicator!
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that, based on a police report he had not seen prior to th-t
day, he determined that he had a conflict in Representing
defendant. The report reflected that charges had been
investigated by Kaysville City Police, and defense counsel ,.< d
served as a prosecutor for Kaysville in the past. After
consultation, however, defendant determined that he would waive
the conflict for purposes of the preliminary hearing only. The
trial court examined defendant about his waiver and ruled that
the hearing could continue. Substitute defense counsel
represented defendant at the trial. (At the commencement of
the trial, defendant made a motion to disqualify substitute
counsel, which was denied.) Defendant now renews his original
objection to Cella's representation at the preliminary hearing,
attacking his own waiver of the conflict on the basis that he
should not have been put to the choice of waiving the conflict
or waiting in jail for substitute counsel's appointment. A
defendant generally may not premise a claim of error on a
ruling that he himself both assented to and sought. See, e.g.,
State v. Parsons, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 2" (Utah 1989) (A
defendant may not allege on appeal prejudicial error which was
affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally waived); State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987) (Invited error is
procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially
where ample opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a
result) . We hold that defendant has waived the apparent
conflict of interest and may not premise error on that basis.
,For the foregone reasons, the conviction appealed '. i om.
is affirmed.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge
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CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

1 hereby oertny tnat 1 caused to be served four true and
correct copys of th? foregoing Wri^ c* Certiorari unor. the
Utah Attorney ^ ^ ^ ^ i by deposit postage pre-pair; *-*/l4, - •Mail.
Dated this IL

day of >k*H*»*^

1990
/

Thomas R. Humphries

